Introduction

Earlier this year, at a symposium in Texas, W. Laurence Craig spoke of the successes of arbitration as a self-contained process, noting that the vast majority of arbitrations, particularly those administered by an arbitral institution, were concluded without the need of any judicial intervention whatsoever.1 It was a timely reminder of the value of institutional arbitration, and the arbitrator's increasingly central role in the modern dispute resolution process. For, as arbitration continues to evolve as the preferred means of transnational dispute resolution, it is the arbitrator rather than a national judge that will decide most international commercial disputes. And, while arbitral institutions are there to assist and provide support, it is the arbitrator upon whom the success of any arbitration ultimately depends. The challenging nature of his role was described by Frances Kellor, an early leader of the American Arbitration Association: "When an arbitrator is conscientious, painstaking and fair in arriving at his decision and bases that decision upon the proofs submitted; when he brings his competence and common sense to bear impartiality upon the issue before him; when he follows the procedure laid down in the arbitration law and in rules of procedure and makes each party feel that he has had a fair trial; then arbitration is a proceeding which commands confidence, and the award is one that satisfies justice."2

I. Sources of authority

The powers of arbitrators are expressly conferred upon them by the agreement of the parties, applicable law, and specifically by institutional arbitration rules. A broadly worded arbitration clause, covering disputes "arising out of or relating to the contract," has been judicially interpreted as giving arbitrators broad authority as to the subject and conduct of arbitral proceedings? 3From a U.S. perspective, a series of landmark decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court has further buttressed their role by holding that arbitrators have competence to decide the broadest range of commercial claims,4 that agreements to arbitrate are to be construed broadly in favor of their competence,5 and that an arbitrator's award is entitled to a high degree of deference and finality.6 Each of these principles apply with particular force in the international sphere, for as the court has noted "international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the needs of the international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes"7 all require the liberal enforcement of international arbitration agreements and awards.

In addition to supportive arbitration court decisions, a growing number of nations, drawing inspiration from the UNCITRAL Model Law, have enacted arbitration legislation outlining the arbitrator's role and certain aspects[Page60:] of arbitral procedure.8 Even more complete will be the institutional rules chosen by the parties as governing their arbitration. It is the rules that spell out in detail the arbitrator's powers and duties, distinguish them from those of the institution, and address many of the practical aspects of arbitral proceedings.

II. AAA arbitration rules

Modern arbitration rules tend to converge in their provisions, empowering arbitrators, safeguarding due process, and establishing procedural steps for prompt and effective arbitration. Even though considerable harmonization of institutional procedures has been achieved, distinct features which impact on the arbitrator's function continue to exist. Prominent examples include the Terms of Reference required by ICC rules,9 the pre-arbitration conferences and preliminary hearings10 provided for in the larger AAA cases, and the detailed scrutiny of ICC awards11 which has no parallel in AAA arbitrations or those of any other arbitral institution.

Parties wishing to arbitrate under AAA procedures have available to them two principal options - either to proceed under the recently promulgated International Arbitration Rules, or to elect to arbitrate under the Commercial, Construction, Patent, Securities or other specialized rules, augmented by Supplementary Procedures for International Commercial Arbitration. The International Rules are patterned on the UNCITRAL Rules but contain adjustments for an institutionally administered process. The other rules draw on extensive AAA experience with arbitration in different commercial fields.12 None of the procedures seek to prescribe for the arbitrator how to exercise his function; rather, a clear line exists between the functions of the arbitrator, whose responsibility is to judge the dispute, and those of the institution, which serves in a purely non-judicial administrative role. It is the arbitrator who deals with the substance of the dispute, and the institution that provides administrative support. Implicit in the arrangement is a healthy restraint on the part of AAA staff from advising arbitrators on matters affecting the merits of the dispute, which comports with the rule that the arbitrator not delegate to others his basic responsibility.

Under the AAA's International Rules, once institutional efforts to organize the proceedings have run their course and the tribunal has been constituted, the parties communicate with the arbitrators directly and the latter, consistent with due process, enjoy broad autonomy in the conduct of the proceedings.13 Independent experts may be appointed by the arbitrators to report to them on specific issues,14 and they may grant interim measures of protection,15 both by order or interim award. Examples of such measures granted by arbitrators in recent AAA cases include such orders as for the posting of security, preservation of goods, protection of industrial property, environmental clean-up of an industrial plant, even the appointment of a receiver to manage and liquidate property should the parties be unable to do so themselves.16

Other powers bestowed on the arbitrator by AAA International Rules include control over the presentation of evidence,17 application of the burden of proof,18 the determination of the place of arbitration19 and language of the [Page61:] proceedings when necessary,20 and interpretation of the rules insofar as they relate to the arbitrator's powers and duties.21 The rules also provide that the award must include reasons unless the parties agree otherwise,22 reversing the presumption of U.S. domestic arbitration that reasoned awards are the exception rather than the rule. In another departure from U.S. law, one which conforms to international practice, the rules authorize the tribunal to award the costs of legal representation of a successful party.23 An entirely novel provision, aimed at overcoming obstruction and delay by a non-cooperating arbitrator, provides that if an arbitrator on a three-person tribunal fails to participate in the arbitration, the remaining arbitrators, if they consider it appropriate, may continue with the arbitration and make any decision, ruling or award, notwithstanding the failure by the third arbitrator to participate24 While this provision also has not yet been judicially tested in an AAA international case, legal studies suggest that, in both civil and common law countries, courts will respect awards of truncated tribunals if the parties have agreed to that procedure.25

Briefly contrasted with the International Rules, the Commercial and other AAA rules require all communications between the parties and the arbitral tribunal except at oral hearings to be routed through the AAA;26 do not contain specific provisions on the appointment of experts;27 governing law, modification of awards, termination of proceedings, and the award of attorney fees.

In certain aspects of case handling the AAA will serve as a buffer between the arbitrator and the parties, especially where issues of compensation are involved. Generally, parties and arbitrators welcome the institution's involvement in matters of arbitrator compensation since the resolution of these issues is best achieved through the institution, in consultation with the parties and the arbitrator. In AAA cases arbitrator compensation is not based on the amount in dispute, but on the amount of service, taking into account the size and complexity of the case, and customary rates charged by lawyers and other professionals for their services.28 An appropriate daily or hourly rate is customarily arranged. If compensation terms cannot be agreed upon by the parties, they are set by the AAA. And, if a required payment of administrative fees or arbitrator compensation is not made, the arbitrator may suspend or terminate the proceedings.29 In the event that the award is delivered prior to payment by the parties of the arbitrator's fees the AAA, while not legally obligated, if authorized by the arbitrator, will seek to collect such moneys on the arbitrator's behalf.

III. Arbitral jurisdiction

When issues regarding the validity or existence of an arbitration agreement arise, U.S. law generally provides that the parties may either seek an early judicial determination or submit the issue to the arbitrator.30 Consistent with modern international practice, reflected in the doctrine of Kompetenz-Kompetenz, the AAA International Arbitration Rules provide expressly that the tribunal "shall have the power to rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement."31 This formulation extends the existing U.S. rule of severability providing that under a broad arbitration clause, the question of fraud in the [Page62:] inducement of the contract, as distinguished from the arbitration clause itself, is in the first instance for the arbitrators, not the courts, to decide.32

A related question, recently, considered by the U.S. Supreme Court in the First Options case,33 is that of the proper scope of judicial review of an arbitrator's award on jurisdiction, in this instance whether the petitioner was personally bound by the arbitration agreement. In reaching its decision the court noted at the outset that the purpose of the FAA is to ensure the enforcement of private arbitration agreements according to their terms. It held that unless the parties have agreed unmistakably to submit the question of arbitrability itself to the arbitrator for decision, the standard of review of an arbitrator's decision on jurisdiction will be de novo, i.e. without the traditional deference accorded to the arbitrator's decision on the merits of the dispute. Such interpretation comports with the laws of most national jurisdictions, reaffirms the contractual nature of arbitration, and adds vitality to the jurisdictional provisions of the rules.

While arbitral awards are always subject to a degree of judicial scrutiny, U.S. courts generally will refrain from interfering with the arbitrator's conduct of the arbitration. This well-established principle is illustrated by a current Swiss arbitration,34 in which the licensee sought from the arbitrators a preliminary ruling on whether they will apply U.S. antitrust law, which they declined to grant. The licensee then brought a U.S. court action for antitrust violations, seeking a declaration from the court that the arbitration agreement is void as to the antitrust claims. Despite the suit, the arbitrators proceeded with the arbitration, ruling that whether U.S. antitrust law in addition to Swiss law will be applied represents an arbitrable issue not susceptible to an early isolated determination. The court dismissed the action noting that "it would be sheer speculation to attempt to predict in advance what law the tribunal will decide to apply to plaintiff's antitrust claims". It deemed it premature to find that the arbitration clause has operated as a prospective waiver of plaintiff's rights, and citing Mitsubishi, noted that in appropriate cases the New York Convention reserves the right to refuse enforcement of an award where the "recognition of enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country".

IV. Arbitrator impartiality

An indispensable element of any arbitration is that the parties have confidence in the impartiality of the arbitrator. Arbitration laws,35 ethical codes36 and the various AAA rules37 spell out the impartiality requirement and the arbitrator's duty to disclose potentially disqualifying relationships.

To ensure the enforceability of awards rendered under AAA auspices, the Association has adopted a cautious attitude, requiring each arbitrator to disclose "any past or present relationship with the parties or their counsel, direct or indirect, whether financial professional social or of any other kind".38 This obligation extends to matters which may arise during the arbitral proceedings and to any change, at any time, in the biographical information previously provided by the arbitrator to the AAA.

In a leading decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that arbitrators "should err on the side of disclosure" because "it is better that the relationship be disclosed at the outset when the parties are free to reject the arbitrator or accept him with knowledge of the relationship".39 At the same time it must be recognized that "an arbitrator's business relationships may be diverse indeed, involving more or less remote commercial connections with great numbers of people".40 Accordingly, an arbitrator "cannot be expected to provide the parties with his [Page63:] complete and unexpurgated business biography", nor is an arbitrator called on to disclose interests or relationships that are merely trivial".41

In ruling on arbitrator challenges, the AAA employs a flexible approach, balancing the need for party confidence in the fairness of the arbitration with those of efficiency and expedition. An arbitrator will generally be excused from serving whenever the disclosure reflects a significant relationship with an interested party, its counsel, or an important witness in the arbitration. The criteria which guide the AAA in its rulings on challenges, are whether a particular relationship is "direct" rather than "remote", "substantial", "ongoing", and "significant" rather than "uncertain" or "speculative".42 Given the serious consequences of arbitrator disqualification once hearings have progressed, a stricter standard is applied at this stage of the process ( an arbitrator will only be disqualified if the disclosed information reflects such an interest on the arbitrator's part as would suggest the likelihood of judicial vacatur of the award.

Two interesting issues bearing on the arbitrator's duty to disclose were recently addressed by the California courts. The first related to the arbitrator's prior service in cases involving the same party,43 the other the obligation of a lawyer arbitrator to conduct a conflicts check, for purposes of disclosure, with the law firm of which he formerly was a partner.44 Since changes in law firm affiliation are no longer infrequent or necessarily harmonious, complying with such a requirement would be quite onerous, at times even impossible.

The prior service issue arose in a domestic medical malpractice arbitration not administered by the AAA. After the arbitration, it was discovered that the arbitrator had been named by the winning party as its party-appointed arbitrator on a number of prior occasions, and the court found that the arbitrator's failure to disclose these prior engagements justified vacatur of the award. The decision suggests, at a time when the use of arbitration is being broadly extended to consumer transactions, heightened judicial concern for the fairness of arbitration involving consumers. Nonetheless, even the International Bar Association Rules of Ethics for International Arbitrators, which were developed by practicing lawyers from all continents, provide that a prospective arbitrator should disclose prior appointment as arbitrator involving a party.45

The prior law firm issue stemmed from a large international partnership dispute arbitrated under AAA auspices. In that case, the California Court of Appeals, in considering a challenge to the award, held that arbitrators did not have an absolute duty to check for possible conflicts between the party to the case being presented to them and those handled by their former law firms. Finding no obligation on the part of the former firm to provide a list of its current or former clients, and that the arbitrator was unaware that his prior firm at some time represented companies affiliated with the winning party, the court refused to vacate the arbitrator's award merely because information suggesting possible bias was not disclosed. The test in determining whether an award should be vacated for nondisclosure of information, according to the court, is an objective one, i.e. whether the record actually reveals facts creating an impression of bias.

While the major burden of disclosure falls upon the arbitrator, responsibility to ascertain potentially disqualifying relationships rests on both the arbitrator and the parties. As observed by a New York Appellate Court: "a party to an arbitration may [not] sit idly back and rely exclusively upon the arbitrator's disclosure. If a party goes forward with arbitration, having actual knowledge of the arbitrator's bias, or of facts that reasonably should have prompted further, limited inquiry, it may not later claim bias based upon the failure to disclose such facts."46

[Page64:]

V. Remedial powers

An important difference between AAA International and other rules relates to the choice of law and the arbitrator's remedial powers. The International Rules require expressly that the tribunal apply the substantive law or laws designated by the parties. Absent such designation, the tribunal may apply such law or laws directly, without the need to choose a set of conflict of laws rules. In arbitrations involving the application of contracts, the Rules also provide that the tribunal shall decide in accordance with their terms and shall take into account the usages of the trade applicable to the contract. The tribunal may not decide as amiable compositeur or ex aequo et bono unless the parties have expressly authorized it to do so.47 These provisions have their special importance in international arbitration and differ markedly from other AAA rules, which define an arbitrator's authority in the following terms: "The arbitrator may grant any remedy of relief that the arbitrator deems just and equitable and within the scope of agreement of the parties, including, but not limited to, specific performance of the contract."48

A particularly interesting issue addressed recently by the U.S. Supreme Court relates to the power of an arbitrator to award punitive damages. In 1985, in Mitsubishi,49 in considering the arbitrability of anti-trust claims and statutory remedy of treble damages, the court suggested that there was no reason why such damages could only be obtained in a U.S. court. Earlier this year, in Mastrobuono,50 the court also upheld an award of punitive damages in a domestic securities arbitration despite a contractual clause designating New York law, which prohibits arbitrators from awarding such damages. Rare as this type of award may be, the court reasoned that the Federal Arbitration Act's purpose is that private agreements to arbitrate be enforced according to their terms, and that if the parties agreed to include punitive damage claims within the issues to be arbitrated, then the Act ensures that such terms will be enforced, despite a rule of state law precluding such a remedy.

While the Mastrobuono decision has evoked its share of criticism and seems far removed from the time when arbitration was disdained for usurping the jurisdiction of judges, the ruling assures arbitrators of broad remedial powers consistent with the currently wide scope of arbitrable subject matter - where these comport with the intent of the contracting parties. It should be noted, however, that: "There is no suggestion in Mastrobuono that an arbitration clause that expressly prohibits arbitrators from awarding punitive damages, or that adopts arbitral rules which foreclose punitive damages, would be denied enforcement in an arbitration in New York or under New York law. To the contrary, the thrust of Mastrobuono is that the parties may fashion rules for their arbitration by agreement that will apply wherever the arbitration is held, without regard to local law."51 And, while punitive damages are alien to the jurisprudence of many countries, some of which might well refuse to enforce such an award, where applicable law allows or provides for punitive damages, arbitrators should be in a position to adjudicate them.

VI. AAA international panel

An important advantage of arbitration is the ability of parties to select arbitrators of any nationality, expert in the subject matter of the dispute, familiar with the industry and trade involved, and knowledgeable in modern arbitration practice. AAA international arbitration cases are of an infinite variety. Some involve modest routine transactions, others large and highly complex disputes. Some require arbitrators with outstanding legal skills, others panellists with specialized technical expertise. Most will benefit from both. The choice of arbitrator, however, will be key, for in addition to his expertise, the legal culture of the arbitrator, and that of the advocates, will strongly influence how the arbitration is [Page65:]conducted. The broad range of expertise that arbitration can provide is illustrated by one rather interesting case.52 Several major oil companies were extracting oil under separate but contiguous concession agreements. After time they discovered that they were extracting oil from the same reservoir. The post government, unwilling to reform the agreements, insisted that the parties themselves resolve the difficulty. These concluded that arbitration would be the best approach and requested the AAA to handle the process, providing detailed instructions on the expertise each arbitrator should possess. To meet the needs of the situation, the AAA conducted a world-wide search and assembled a first rate multinational panel which, operating in strict confidence, promptly scheduled hearings. Each of the arbitrators had unique qualifications and extensive experience with different aspects of the problem at hand. It is but one example of the range of arbitral expertise available, and the institution's capacity to facilitate an appropriate match to meet the needs of a given dispute.

Noteworthy also is the growing emphasis being placed on the arbitrator's organizational and management skills. A growing consensus has emerged that, to encourage efficient and effective arbitration, it is the arbitrator's duty to aggressively manage the arbitral proceedings. Particularly in complex international cases, significant savings in time and money can be achieved by proper management and it has been suggested that arbitrators must "recognize that they have a responsibility for the pace of the proceedings (and) that an activist attitude is the most important contribution an arbitrator can make to overcoming delay".53

It is established practice for the AAA to survey parties to its cases to gauge their level of satisfaction with the process and the arbitrator's performance. The latest survey of parties to international cases handled by the New York office reflects that 100% of responding parties ranked the arbitrators as excellent to good, despite the fact that 1/3 of the respondents did not prevail in the arbitration. 90% also stated that they would choose the same arbitrator again. Not surprisingly, of the various aspects of the process, arbitrator quality was the most important element.

In recent years, to provide parties with wide choice in the selection of arbitrators, approximately 3,000 individuals were listed on the AAA's international panel. Presently, all AAA panels are undergoing review with a view to reducing the panels to reasonable numbers that reflect only arbitrators of the highest quality. This initiative also contemplates the acceleration of training, and encouragement of skills for arbitrators who are already on the panels.

VII. Immunity

With an annual caseload of almost 60 thousand arbitrations, both international and domestic, it occasionally falls to the AAA to protect the process of arbitration in post award actions which may attack the award, the arbitrator, or the institution itself.

Generally, arbitrators are engaged by the parties to decide their disputes. Their names are maintained on AAA panels for selection by the parties or appointment by the AAA pursuant to the parties' adopted rules. Arbitrators, even though they are often so perceived, are neither employees nor agents of the AAA. However, in support of their role and to ensure an effective process, the AAA has voluntarily provided representation to arbitrators when issues of quasi-judicial immunity are raised in judicial proceedings.

The doctrine of judicial immunity is based on public policy grounds to ensure the finality of court decisions and independence of the judiciary.54The same judicial immunity was extended by U.S. law to arbitrators because of the "quasi-judicial" nature of their functions as adjudicators. The standard used for determining when the appropriate circumstances for immunity exist is that of "functional comparability" of an arbitrator's role to that of[Page66:] a judge.55 Over the years, the protection of immunity has been extended to arbitrators in a wide variety of contexts, providing protection against allegations of collusion, improper decisions, conspiracy to violate competition laws, acting in excess of jurisdiction, and failure to disqualify oneself as arbitrator.

A sizeable body of case law also exists to the effect that an arbitrator may not be deposed for the purpose of clarifying or impeaching the award.56 Whether serving in a domestic or international case, as long as the arbitrator functions in his quasi-judicial role, he will enjoy immunity from civil liability.57 Absent an objective basis and reasonable belief that misconduct has occurred, he may not be required to testify in a court of law in order to impeach or clarify his award.58

The arbitral institution also has benefited from this cloak of immunity, on the theory that if arbitration is to be safely utilized as an effective means of resolving controversies, the immunity attaching must extend beyond the arbitrators themselves to all "indispensable" proceedings.59 The extension of immunity to agencies sponsoring arbitration is a natural and necessary product of the policies underlying arbitral immunity for there would be little value to the arbitral procedure if one were to shift the liability to the sponsoring organization.

Several years ago, immunity was denied an arbitrator and the AAA in a breach of contract action when the arbitrator, a former bar association president, who was experiencing personal difficulties, failed to render a timely award.60 In reaction to this ruling, legislation was enacted by the state abrogating the decision and reaffirming the immunity of arbitrators. The legislature concluded that a limitation on immunity would have a "chilling effect" on the utility of arbitration by making it more difficult to find individuals willing to serve as arbitrators; placing unfair burdens on arbitrators to render thoughtful and correct decisions, since they may become more concerned in the rendering of a timely decision rather than a well thought out one; and encouraging lawsuits against arbitrators by those dissatisfied with the award.61

At about the same time, the AAA also included a liability exclusion provision in its rules,62which has had the salutary effect of discouraging suits against arbitrators and the institution. While the rule was upheld in a recent case, experience with the provision is still limited. It may well be that, in a truly egregious case, one involving willful and deliberate wrongdoing, the court may limit the scope of the disclaimer. To a large extent, the immunity accorded to an arbitrator will also depend on the place of arbitration and country in which a complaint is lodged. For in many countries arbitral immunity is more limited, protecting at best against allegations of negligence, and disfavoring broadly worded exculpatory clauses.63It is gratifying to note, however, that the general level of arbitral performance has been such as to make suits against arbitrators and institutions a very rare event indeed.

1
W. Laurence Craig, "Some Trends and Developments in the Laws and Practices of International Commercial Arbitration", 30 Tex. Int'l. L.J., pp. 1, 7 (1995).

2
Frances Kellor, Arbitration in Action, A Code for Civil, Commercial and Industrial Arbitrations , p. 16 (Harper & Brothers Publishers 1941).

3
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp . v. Mercury Constr. Corp. , 460 U.S. 1 (1983).

4
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. , 500 U.S. 20 (1991); Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon , 482 U.S. 220; and Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. , 473 U.S. 614 (1985).

5
Id., see Mitsubishi , at p. 634.

6
United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp ., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).

7
See Mitsubishi, supra note 4, at p. 629.

8
UNCITRAL Secretariat, Status of Conventions, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/401 (25 May 1994). See also, Pieter Sanders, "Unity and Diversity in the Adoption of the Model Law", 11 Arbitration International , p. 1(1995).

9
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Rules of Arbitration, Art. 13.

10
Rules 2 & 4 of the American Arbitration Association (AAA) Supplementary Procedures For Large, Complex Disputes.

11
ICC Rules, Art. 21.

12
Michael F. Hoellering, "How to Draft an AAA Arbitration Clause", in 1991-1992 Arbitration & the Law: AAA General Counsel's Annual Report, p. 166.

13
Article 16 of the AAA's International Arbitration Rules.

14
Article 23 of the AAA's International Arbitration Rules.

15
Article 22 of the AAA's International Arbitration Rules.

16
Michael F. Hoellering, "Conservatory and Provisional Measures in International Arbitration: The Practices and Experiences of the American Arbitration Association", Ninth Joint ICC/ICSID/AAA Colloquium on International Arbitration, held in Paris, France, on November 6, 1992.

17
Article 20 of the AAA's International Arbitration Rules.

18
Id.

19
Article 13 of the AAA's International Arbitration Rules.

20
Article 14 of the AAA's International Arbitration Rules.

21
Article 37 of the AAA's International Arbitration Rules.

22
Article 28 of the AAA's International Arbitration Rules.

23
Article 32 of the AAA's International Arbitration Rules.

24
Article 11 of the AAA's International Arbitration Rules.

25
Stephen M. Schwebel, International Arbitration: Three Salient Problems , p. 146 (Grotius Publications Limited (1987)).

26
Rule 29 of the AAA's Commercial Arbitration Rules.

27
Rule 31 of the AAA's Commercial Arbitration Rules.

28
Article 33 of the AAA's International Arbitration Rules.

29
Article 34 of the AAA's International Arbitration Rules.

30
9 United States Code (U.S.C.), Section 4. See also, AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986).

31
Article 15 of the AAA's International Arbitration Rules.

32
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin MFG. Co. , 388 U.S. 395 (1967).

33
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan , 115 S. Ct. 1920, 131 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995).

34
George Fischer Foundry Systems, Inc . v. Adolph H. Hottinger Maschinenbau , 55 F.3d 1206 (1995).

35
9 U.S.C., Section 10(a)(2).

36
Canon II of The Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, prepared by a Joint Committee of Members of the American Arbitration Association and the American Bar Association (1977).

37
Article 7 of the AAA's International Arbitration Rules.

38
From the Forms of the AAA.

39
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty , 393 U.S. 145, 151-152 (1968).

40
Id.

41
Id.

42
Michael F. Hoellering, "The Experience of the American Arbitration Association in the Selection and Appointment of Arbitrators", Sixth Joint ICC/ICSID/ AAA Colloquium on International Arbitration, held in Paris, France, on October 27, 1988.

43
Neaman v. Kaiser Foundation Hospital , 9 Cal.App.4th 1170 (1992).

44
Betz v. Pankow , 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 107, 31 Cal.App.4th 1503 (1995).

45
Rules of Ethics for International Arbitrators, Section 4.2(a), International Bar Association, Section on Business Law.

46
Rubenstein v. Otterbourg , 357 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1973).

47
Article 29 of the AAA's International Arbitration Rules.

48
Rule 43 of the AAA's Commercial Arbitration Rules.

49
See Mitsubishi, supra note 4, at p. 636.

50
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. , 115 S.Ct. 1212, 131 L.Ed.2d 76 (1995).

51
"Mastrobuono: What Effect on New York as an International Arbitration Venue?" International Dispute Resolution Update (Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn, LLP) Vol. 1, No.2, July 1995, pp. 2-3.

52
From the Files of the AAA.

53
Howard M. Holtzmann, "What an Arbitrator Can Do To Overcome Delays in International Arbitration", Justice for a Generation , p. 335 (American Bar Association 1985).

54
"Arbitral Immunity", Lawyers' Arbitration Letter , Vol. 14, No. 4 (Vicki M. Young, ed., American Arbitration Association 1990).

55
Id., at 4.

56
Domke on Commercial Arbitration , Section 23:02 (Rev. Ed.) (Clark Boardman Callaghan 1991).

57
Sperry International Trade, Inc. v. Government of Israel , 602 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).

58
"Case Law Update", Lawyers' Arbitration Letter , Vol. 9, No. 3, at 6 (Sept. 1985).

59
Corbin v. Washington Fire & Marine Ins. Co. , 1278 F. Supp. 393 (D.S.C. 1968), aff'd 398 F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1968).

60
Baar v. Tigerman , 189 Cal. Rptr. 834 (Ct. App. 1983).

61
From Commentary on S.B. 1001 by Chairman Bill Lockyer, Senate Committee on Judiciary (1985-86 Regular Session) and Chairman Elihu M. Harris, Assembly Committee on Judiciary (1985).

62
Article 36 of the AAA's International Arbitration Rules.

63
Julian D.M. Lew, Ed., The Immunity of Arbitrators (Lloyd's of London Press Ltd 1990).